This paper considers a two-period model of market entry with homogeneous products and switching costs. It is shown that the procompetitive e ect of a foreign rm's entry (i.e., unilateral trade liberalization) emerges before the entry. Also, conditions that are conducive to a competitive environment in the second-period are shown to yield a less competitive outcome in the rst-period. That is, when the marginal cost of the foreign entrant is relatively low, the rst-period
Introduction
The proliferation of trade liberalization through both economic integration (e.g., the European Union) and preferential trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA) has spawned a vast literature on the implications of trade liberalization. In particular, in a single-period setting, pro-competitive gains from trade due to foreign rms' entry into the domestic market have been studied extensively. 1 It is well known that the entry of a cost-competitive (i.e., low marginal cost) foreign rm yields a highly competitive outcome. As yet, however, little attention has been paid to the implications of trade liberalization in the context of products with switching costs.
In a model with switching costs, it is more costly for consumers (or wholesalers) to buy from one producer in one period and from another producer in the next. 2 In the context of trade liberalization, switching costs include transaction and information costs for import wholesalers. 3 Important transaction costs result from di erences in languages and customs. If a wholesaler has been buying a good (e.g., steel) from a domestic rm and decides instead to buy it from a foreign rm, then the wholesaler must hire new person-1 See, for example, Brander (1981) , Markusen (1981) . 2 See Klemperer (1987a , 1987b , 1987c . 3 nel that are familiar with that country's language and customs. Another transaction cost is that of negotiating a contract or agreement with the new supplier. Contracting costs with a new foreign supplier are usually higher than contracting costs with a domestic supplier. Switching costs are thus an important factor in any industry in which the product passes through a wholesaler's hands. 4 Although the vitality of industries characterized by switching costs is closely related to trade liberalization, the literature on trade liberalization is almost exclusively focused on products without switching costs. Since the role of switching costs is ampli ed in the globalized world, it seems important to explore the impact of liberalization in the trade of products with switching costs.
As its primary contribution, this paper examines how trade liberalization (i.e., the entry of a foreign rm into the domestic market) a ects the behavior of a domestic monopolist in the presence of switching costs. For these purposes I construct a simple two-period market-entrance model with switching costs. It will be shown that, for the home country, there are always gains from a foreign rm's entry. It will also be shown that a competitive environment in the second-period caused by the foreign entrant's relatively low marginal costs is associated with a less competitive outcome in the rstperiod because the domestic monopolist produces less. The latter result di ers from one obtained in standard single-period models of trade liberalization in that the inclusion of switching costs drastically changes the impact of trade liberalization.
The model
Consider a two-period market-entrance game with homogeneous products and switching costs. A home rm is present in the domestic market in both periods, and producing output x t in each period t. A foreign entrant observes the home rm's rst-period output and enters market in the second-period with output y 2 . The rms' products are functionally identical, that is, we assume they are undi erentiated except by switching costs. Demand in period t is f t (q), to be interpreted as the q-th consumer having reservation price f t (q) for one unit of either rm's product in period t, net of any switching costs. Each consumer has a`switching cost' s, which we take as given, of buying either rm's product for the rst time. Products cannot be stored between periods. We assume no discounting.
We assume Cournot equilibrium in the second-period leading to market prices p 2 and p 2 for the home rm's and the foreign rm's products respec-tively. Thus in the second-period
In what follows, to simplify the argument, we assume linear demand curve: Before moving to trading equilibrium, let us examine the equilibrium without the foreign rm's entry brie y. In this case, the home rm's pro t is represented by
represents pro ts in period-t. We can obtain the equilibrium output as
where`bar' indicates the equilibrium value without the foreign rm's entry.
Consumer surplus CS = CS 1 + CS 2 , total pro ts, and welfare are given as follows:
Now, let us move to the case with the foreign rm's entry. In this case, the analysis is simpli ed by considering the rm's second-period reaction curves. We write R(y 2 ) for the home rm's reaction curve if consumers had no switching costs, and R 0 (y 2 ) and R (x 2 ) when consumers have a switching cost s. The heavy line in Figure 1 is the home rm's reaction curve given
x 1 > 0. To derive it, we rst recall that for x 2 x 1 , the home rm's residual demand is f 2 (x 2 + y 2 ), whereas for x 2 > x 1 , the residual demand is f 2 (x 2 + y 2 ) s, as if all its consumers had to pay a switching cost s.
The second-period Cournot-Nash equilibrium is at the intersection E.
In this case, a small increase in x 1 increases the home rm's second-period output and decreases the foreign rm's second-period output, that is,
Decreasing y 2 raises the home rm's second-period residual demand everywhere and so increases the home rm's second-period pro ts. Therefore, the home chooses x 1 at a higher level than if it simply maximised its long-run pro ts ignoring the e ect of x 1 on y 2 . In other words, the home rm can create customer base x 1 strategically in order to a ect the second-period equilibrium.
Considering Figure 1 , the second-period equilibrium outputs become as follows:
The home rm's total pro ts are
Substitute (4) into (5) and maximising yields the equilibrium output:
where`tilde' indicates the equilibrium value with the foreign rm's entry.
Consumer surplus and total pro ts are given as follows:
:
Since the welfare of the home country is equal to the sum of the consumer surplus and the pro ts of the home rm, welfare under the foreign rm's entry can be shown to bẽ
Using (1) and (6), one can obtain the change of the home rm's output level by the announcement of the foreign rm's entry.
It is important to note that the anticipation of the foreign rm's entry in the second period increases the home rm's equilibrium output in both periods.
Note that this result occurs because the home rm has a strategic incentive to create the customer base in order to a ect the second-period equilibrium.
Proposition 1: Anticipation of the foreign rm's entry in the second period increases the home rm's rst-period output level.
In other words, given that there are switching costs, the pro-competitive e ect of the foreign rm's entry (i.e., unilateral trade liberalization) emerges before the entry. This result seems to reinforce the argument for pro-competitive gains from trade liberalization, which was emphasized by both Brander (1981) and Markusen (1981) . To see this point precisely, let us consider welfare changes by the foreign rm's entry. Suppose that c = 0 holds ini-tially. In this case, welfare changes can be calculated as follows:
Also, by di erentiatingW with respect to c , one can obtain
Combining these two conditions, one can state the following proposition on welfare gains from the foreign rm's entry.
Proposition 2: Given that c > 0 holds, there are always gains from the foreign rms' entry.
Before closing this section, it is worthwhile to note that the impact of changes in the foreign rm's marginal costs. Equation (6) implies the interesting impact of trade liberalization in the presence of switching costs.
Proposition 3:
As the foreign entrant's marginal costs becomes higher, the larger the home rm's rst-period output.
In other words, the more cost-competitive the foreign entrant is, the lower the incentive to capture consumers in the rst-period [i.e., (dx 1 =dc ) > 0].
This result di ers from those obtained in trade models without switching costs. In those models, trade with cost-competitive foreign rms makes the market more competitive. In this model with switching costs, however, the promise of competitive market conditions in the future period makes the current period less competitive. The principle involved is that, since the motivation to capture consumers in the rst-period is to shift pro ts away from the foreign entrant in the second-period, a less-competitive domestic rm (which has a lower incentive to shift pro ts) will choose a lower output level in the rst-period. 5 
Conclusion
In a two-period market-entry model with switching costs, it has been shown that the anticipation of the foreign rm's entry increases the home country's welfare. Also, it has been shown that conditions that cause a more competitive environment in the second period (i.e., relatively low marginal costs for a foreign entrant) yield a less competitive outcome in the rst-period. 6 The interaction between trade liberalization and rm behavior in the presence of switching costs is crucial: if the magnitude of switching costs is substantial, some of pro-competitive gains from trade liberalization in the future period 
